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In 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) published an
extensive account of genocide in Rwanda, Leave None to Tell the Story. Based on interviews and archival work
conducted by a team of researchers and written primarily by Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell was quickly
recognised as the definitive account of the 1994 genocide. In the ensuing two decades, however, much
additional research has added to our understanding of the 1994 violence. In this paper, I assess Leave None to
Tell the Story in light of the research conducted since its publication, focusing in particular on three major
challenges to the analysis. First, research into the organisation of the genocide disputes the degree to which it
was planned in advance. Second, micro-level research into the motivations of those who participated disputes the
influence of ideology on the genocide. Third, research has provided increasing evidence and details of violence
perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). I contend that despite these correctives, much of the analysis
continues to hold up, such as the role of national figures in promoting genocide at the local level, the impact of
the dynamics of local power struggles on the violence, and the patterns of violence, including the effort after the
initial massacres to implicate a wide portion of the population. Finally, as a member of the team that researched
and helped write Leave None to Tell, I reflect on the value of this rare sort of research project that engages human
rights organisations in an academic research project.
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Introduction
Beginning in 1990, the small Central African country of
Rwanda was shaken by a pro-democracy movement and
a rebel invasion, led by exiled members of the minority
Tutsi ethnic group. The government responded to the
dual pressures of protest and war by offering political
reforms while simultaneously seeking to regain popu-
larity with the members of the majority Hutu group by
stirring up anti-Tutsi ethnic sentiments. Both a number
of new domestic human rights groups and international
human rights organisations documented the regime’s
repression of journalists and opposition politicians and
violent attacks against Tutsi. In January 1993, both
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) participated in a
ten-member panel of international experts that
investigated human rights abuses in Rwanda and pub-
lished a devastating report that linked the government to
all recent cases of anti-Tutsi ethnic violence and
considered, given their nature, whether they might
constitute genocide, though they suggested that the
numbers killed might not reach the threshold to be
labelled genocide (Fédération Internationale des Droits
de l’Homme et al., 1993).
Just over a year later, of course, supporters of the
Rwandan government launched a wave of violence
whose status as genocide could not be disputed. In just
over three months, soldiers, police, and civilian militia
groups killed an estimated 80 per cent of the Tutsi then
living in Rwanda. In the aftermath of this horrific
violence, HRW and FIDH undertook a joint research
project to explain how genocide on this magnitude could
be possible just a few decades after the pledge of ‘never
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again’ that emerged from the Holocaust. In March 1995, a
research team organised by AlisonDes Forges of HRWand
Eric Gillet of FIDH established an office in Rwanda and
began to gather evidence, focusing both on the organisation
of the genocide at the national level and on its execution at
the local level, with an exploration of three local case studies.
The research project that ultimately involved a dozen
researchers culminated in the publication in 1999 of the
789-page report, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in
Rwanda, written primarily by Des Forges (1999).
Leave None to Tell the Story was quickly recognised as
the definitive account of the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi,
winning the Lemkin Award for the best book on
genocide and becoming the go-to source for information
about the genocide. Yet in the twenty years since its
publication, numerous additional studies have explored
Rwanda’s genocide. In this paper, I revisit Leave None to
Tell in light of more recent research and publications on
the 1994 violence in Rwanda. I find three major areas
where the analysis is challenged – the degree of planning
prior to the implementation of the genocide, the
motivations for participation, and the significance of
violence perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front –
but on the whole, I contend that the analysis holds up.
Finally, I argue that the production of Leave None to Tell,
where human rights organisations engaged in academic
research, is a model worth replicating.
Key Findings in Leave None to Tell the
Story
Beginning in March 1995, a team of researchers for
HRW and FIDH began collecting data about the 1994
violence in Rwanda. Des Forges took the lead in
interviewing national leaders, such as military and
government officials, while the research team established
an office in Butare as a base for conducting local-level
research. The team, which I joined in late 1995, focused
on case studies of three local communities – the
university town and regional capital Butare; Nyakizu, a
commune south of Butare, along the Burundi border;
and Musebeya, a commune in the neighbouring region
of Gikongoro. We interviewed a range of individuals
from each of the communities, including some in prison
on genocide charges and many survivors of the genocide.
We also conducted archival work, sorting through
government documents in the regional office of Butare,
the communal office of Nyakizu and several offices in
other parts of the country to find letters, minutes from
meetings and other documents related to security and
violence. The bulk of this grass-roots research was
completed within a year, but the book took several more
years to complete, as Des Forges continued to chase
down interviews and information across the globe.
Appearing five years after the genocide, in 1999, Leave
None to Tell immediately became the most authoritative
source for explaining the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi and
to a lesser extent violence perpetrated by the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF). The book also became the basis for
numerous prosecutions of accused genocide perpetra-
tors. Even before publication of the text, Des Forges
worked closely with prosecutors at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and after its
publication, the book became the basis for numerous
cases in Arusha. Leave None to Tell also has served as the
basis for prosecutions in Canada, Belgium, France,
Sweden, Finland and the United States, including cases
like that of François Bazaramba in Finland that came
directly out of accusations detailed in Leave None to Tell.
Since the book is technically a human rights report
rather than a traditional academic tome, it begins with an
executive summary that lays out the key points. In this
section, I want to highlight several of the central
arguments that Des Forges develops and that themajority
of the text is then devoted to proving. First, Des Forges
makes clear that what happened in Rwanda was in fact
genocide, the targeting killing of members of the Tutsi
ethnic group with the intent to destroy the group, rather
than just random killing driven by popular rage:1
This genocide was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage
by a people consumed by ‘ancient tribal hatreds’. Nor was
it the preordained result of the impersonal forces of
poverty and over-population. This genocide resulted from
the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and
fear to keep itself in power. This small, privileged group
first set the majority against the minority to counter a
growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced
with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating
table, these few powerholders transformed the strategy of
ethnic division into genocide. They believed that the
extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of
the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the
war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a
favorable peace. They seized control of the state and used
its machinery and its authority to carry out the slaughter.
(Des Forges, 1999: 1–2)
In this succinct passage, Des Forges wants to make
clear that the killing of Tutsi in Rwanda was not a
spontaneous popular uprising because of anger over the
assassination of President Habyarimana or arising
uncontrollably from the frustrations of overpopulation
and poverty. Instead the killing was a systematic
slaughter that was planned and executed from above
by leaders intent on protecting their own power. The role
of elites in organising the genocide and their use of the
state to carry out the violence are central points that she
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Most of the killing, however, was carried out by
average Rwandans, and explaining their motivations is
another of Des Forges’ primary goals:
Hundreds of thousands of others chose to participate in
the genocide reluctantly, some only under duress or in fear
of their own lives. Unlike the zealots who never questioned
their original choice, these people had to decide repeatedly
whether or not to participate, each time weighing the kind
of action planned, the identity of the proposed victim, the
rewards of participating and the likely costs of not
participating. Because attacks were incited or ordered by
supposedly legitimate authorities, those with misgivings
found it easier to commit crimes and to believe or pretend
to believe they had done no wrong. (p. 2)
The case studies of Butare, Nyakizu and Musebeya
(and other parts of Gikongoro) that occupy the second
half of the book explore the dynamics of local involve-
ment. They seek to explain exactly how national, regional
and local elites exercised their authority to convince
individuals and communities to participate in the killing.
The main point is that, left to their own devices, average
Rwandans would generally not have killed. To get people
to participate took regular and repeated intervention
from individuals with authority. These elites used
ideological justifications, incentives and threats to inspire
participation. In many cases, local leaders themselves
resisted instigating the violence, requiring national
organisers of the genocide to pressure leaders with
incentives and threats and ultimately to remove those
who posed an impediment to the violence.
Another central point in Leave None to Tell is that the
international community made a deliberate decision to
allow the genocide in Rwanda to take place. The
genocide of the Tutsi was never inevitable, it was
foreseen, and it could have been stopped. In contrast to
authors like Mahmood Mamdani, who argues that the
Rwandan genocide was rooted in Rwanda’s colonial
history (Mamdani, 2001), Des Forges, although an
historian herself, insists that the genocide was not built
into the fabric of Rwandan history but was instead a
conscious political strategy undertaken by a modern
elite. Because the genocide was a well-developed plan, it
could have been prevented and, even after it began, it
could have been stopped.
Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States
and at the United Nations all knew of the preparations for
massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to
prevent it. Aware from the start that Tutsi were being
targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused
to acknowledge the genocide.… When international
leaders did finally voice disapproval, the genocidal autho-
rities listened well enough to change their tactics although
not their ultimate goal. Far from cause for satisfaction, this
small success only underscores the tragedy: if timid
protests produced this result in late April, what might
have been the result in mid-April had all the world cried
‘Never again’. (p. 2)
One chapter of the text is devoted to a chronological
accounting of all of the warning signs that indicated to
internal and international observers the preparations
that were underway for genocide. The penultimate
section of the book outlines the failed response of the
international community, particularly the United
Nations, which had a mission on the ground in Rwanda.
The thread that runs through the text and ties these
three main points together is the idea that the genocide
was a conscious choice. The genocide was neither
accidental nor an inevitable result of history or culture
or demographics. Instead, the genocide was a state-
sponsored programme deliberately chosen by a group of
political, military and business leaders who saw the
violence as a means of preserving their power in the face
of growing threats. This group orchestrated the violence
and determined that Tutsi were to be its primary targets.
They gave orders to their political subordinates to
organise the violence at the local level, and they deployed
their armed forces to help spread the violence. Not all
national leaders approved of the genocide; a few actively
sought to hinder the violence, while many others simply
went along without actively supporting. At every level of
society, individuals had to choose how to respond to the
calls to participate in the killing, and even once
individuals had participated, they had to choose to
continue their participation on a daily basis. Likewise,
Des Forges makes clear that the international com-
munity alsomade deliberate choices to allow the violence
in Rwanda to continue unabated. She shows conclusively
that claims to ignorance about what was happening in
Rwanda were false.
A final point in the text that does not figure into the
initial brief summary at the beginning of the book and
remains somewhat peripheral to the overall argument,
though it is discussed in the introduction, is to highlight
violence perpetrated against civilians by the RPF:
In defeating the interim government and its army, the RPF
ended the genocide. At the same time, its troops commit-
ted grave violations of international humanitarian law by
attacking and killing unarmed civilians.… The RPF
permitted its soldiers to kill persons whom they took to
be Interahamwe or other supposed participants in the
genocide. They killed some in the course of their military
advance, but they executed most in the days and weeks
after combat had finished. They selected the victims from
among civilians grouped in camps, sometimes relying on
accusations by survivors, sometimes on their own inter-
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they were linked with parties opposed to the RPF or
showed potential for becoming political leaders rather than
because they were thought guilty of involvement in the
genocide. (p. 16)
In contrast to the violence that was part of the
genocide, RPF violence was less systematic and, because
it was not aimed at a particular ethnic group with the
intent of destroying it, does not constitute genocide. At
the same time, RPF violence was not simply the action of
rogue soldiers but involved both summary judgment of
those believed to be implicated by the genocide and
attempts to assert control by eliminating individuals who
could threaten RPF power. While the RPF violence was
not genocide, it did represent ‘grave violations of
international humanitarian law’.
Assessing the Argument Twenty Years
On
Over the past twenty years, numerous additional pub-
lications focusing on the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda
and related violence in 1994 have appeared, but in
general, the arguments and analysis in Leave None to Tell
have held up well. As René Lemarchand stated in a recent
review of the state of the literature on the genocide, ‘The
story of Rwanda’s agonies has been told many times in
many forms, but nowhere more persuasively than in
Alison Des Forges’ landmark investigation, Leave No
One To Tell the Story. It remains the most wide-ranging,
thoroughly researched and reliable source of information
on the 1994 genocide’ (Lemarchand, 2013).
Many of the works published since 1999 have gone
into greater depth on specific issues that are covered in
Leave None to Tell and offer detail without contradicting
the basic arguments. For example, several works have
looked in greater depth at sexual and gender-based
violence in the genocide. In Sacrifice as Terror, Christo-
pher Taylor explores the logic of sexual violence within
Rwandan cultural conceptions of Tutsi beauty and
seductiveness (Taylor, 1999). Both Jennie Burnet’s
Genocide Lives in Us and Marie Berry’s War, Women,
and Power are focused primarily on women in post-
genocide Rwanda, but both nevertheless provide greater
detail on the experience of women in the genocide that
remains consistent with Des Forges’ analysis (Berry,
2018; Burnet, 2013). In a series of publications, Philip
Verwimp applies the tools of economics to
understanding not just the causes of the genocide but
such problems as the level of mortality and testing the
theory of double genocide (Verwimp, 2003, 2013). My
own book, Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda, looks
in detail at the role of Christian churches in the violence
(Longman, 2010).
Others provide detail on specific cases. In Rwanda
1994: Les Politiques du Génocide à Butare, André
Guichaoua draws on the research that he compiled for
his testimony at the ICTR to discuss in depth the conduct
of the genocide in the city of Butare, adding details to the
description provided in the chapters on Butare in Leave
None to Tell (Guichaoua, 2005). Jean-Paul Kimonyo’s
Rwanda’s Popular Genocide explores how the genocide
was carried out in several additional local communities
based on his own original research, including adding
additional detail on Butare (Kimonyo, 2016). Still others
provide greater detail on the failures of international
intervention. Michael Barnett provides insight into the
UN’s failures based on his perspective working in New
York at the time (Barnett, 2003), while Romeo Dallaire’s
memoir Shake Hands with the Devil, gives a searing
account of the genocide from the perspective of the
commander of the UN contingent (Dallaire, 2003). A
range of other non-scholarly texts, both memoirs and
collections of testimonies, flesh out the human
experience of the genocide.
Rather than giving a comprehensive account of
everything published on the genocide since 1999, I want
to turn to three specific issues where research has
challenged – sometimes in subtle ways – Des Forges’
conclusions in Leave None to Tell.
Questions of Planning
As in his previous book on Butare, in From War to
Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994,
André Guichaoua (2015) draws on his research for
testifying at the ICTR, this time focusing on the
execution of the genocide at the national level for trials
of military and government officials. His account
provides greater detail about the figures at the centre of
power and how they came to carry out the systematic
slaughter of Rwanda’s Tutsi population and Hutu critics
of the regime. In contrast to most previous authors,
including Des Forges, Guichaoua contends that the
leaders who took over after Habyarimana’s death did
not have a clear plan for the full-scale genocide in
advance. A loosely connected group of powerful
individuals, primarily from Habyarimana’s home
region in the north, many with close connections to
President Habyarimana’s wife, had acted over the
previous two years to consolidate their power in the
face of expanding opposition. They promoted an anti-
Tutsi ideology that treated Tutsi as sub-human, alien
interlopers who should be expelled or eliminated from
Rwanda. They had developed a network of supporters
throughout the country known as Hutu Power, built a
security infrastructure, handed out weapons, and trained
militia groups, so the tools that they needed to carry out
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But according to Guichaoua’s research, there was not a
well-developed, specific plan to carry out genocide. In
fact, in the aftermath of Habyarimana’s assassination,
there was a power struggle among various national
leaders. One group used the president’s death as an
opportunity to launch an attack on people they saw as
the primary threats to their power – opposition politi-
cians, journalists and civil society activists, a large
portion of whom were Tutsi. After a couple of days,
the violence paused, as more moderate elements sought
to stop its spread. But as the international community
made clear that it would take no action against the
country, more extremist elements used the spread of the
violence to consolidate their positions. They then spread
the killing systematically through the country and made
it more specifically focused on Tutsi.
In other words, Guichaoua is arguing that rather than
being the result of a careful master plan, Rwanda
stumbled into genocide, as the strategy of asserting
power by exterminating the Tutsi developed even as it
was being implemented. The discussion carries echoes of
the debate between intentionalists and structuralists in
Holocaust studies, a disagreement over whether the
genocide of Jews was the direct result of a master plan or
grew out of the logic and structures of the Nazi state
(Mason, 1981: 21–40; Browning, 2004). I discussed this
issue with Des Forges shortly before her death, and she
was inclined to agree with Guichaoua’s perspective,
though in practice it makes the intentionality required
to demonstrate genocide somewhat more difficult to
prove in court. What Guichaoua argues does not make
what happened in Rwanda any less a genocide, because
the goal was to wipe out Rwanda’s Tutsi, even if this goal
developed as part of a strategy to consolidate political
power. In fact, the idea that the genocide was notmapped
out in advance reinforces the reality that the violence was
not inevitable and could have been halted with effective
international action.
Ideology and the Motives of Those Who Killed
Many of the early studies of the genocide put major
emphasis on the role of ideology in driving people to
participate. Several works focused specifically on pro-
regime newspapers and radio that were labelled ‘hate
media’ and their diffusion of anti-Tutsi rhetoric
(Chrétien, 1995; Thompson, 2007). Drawing parallels
to the anti-Semitic ideology tied to the Holocaust, the
argument was that the ideology dehumanised the Tutsi,
alienated them from the rest of the population, and
fostered hatred that ultimately drove people to kill. Leave
None to Tell includes a chapter on ‘Propaganda and
Practice’, that explores the anti-Tutsi ideology and a
series of massacres from 1990 to 1993 in which the
application of this ideology to violence was tested.
Throughout the text, there is emphasis on the coded
language used to instigate participation, as Tutsi are
referred to as ‘snakes’ and killing is euphemistically
described as ‘work’ and ‘cutting tall trees’.
Subsequent research on themotivations of people who
participated in the genocide has challenged the centrality
of ideology as a key stimulus for violence. Two important
texts in particular have suggested that most people did
not kill out of hatred of the Tutsi but rather for a variety
of other reasons. In Killing Neighbors, the late Lee Ann
Fujii looked at the ways in which social networks drew
individuals into participating in the killing in two local
communities, one in Rwanda’s north, the other in the
centre of the country. She argues that ethnic difference
was not itself the cause of the violence but was a tool used
by elites to divide the population and that local-level
group dynamics influenced people to participate. She
labels those who killed ‘joiners’, because they were
motivated not primarily by a desire to kill Tutsi but by
a desire to be fully part of the group that was taking part
in the killing (Fujii, 2009).
Based on interviews with dozens of confessed killers,
Scott Straus also challenges the idea that hatred drove the
genocide. In The Order of Genocide, Straus argues that
fear was the primary factor motivating people to join in
the killing. The government organising the genocide
controlled access to information and claimed that the
RPF was killing all Hutu it encountered and that Tutsi
within Rwanda were RPF agents. As the war spread and
RPF fighting drove displaced people across the country,
government claims that participating in violence was
necessary for defensive reasons made sense. More
importantly, though, the fact that the violence was being
ordered by the state and that people who resisted could
be fined, beaten or even killed, filled people with another
kind of fear that interacted with and built on the first and
drove participation (Straus, 2008). In another piece,
Straus further challenges the role of ideology by
demonstrating convincingly that the ‘hate radio’ station
RTLM had a much smaller reach than has been generally
understood. Since RTLM actually only broadcast within
a very small range, it could not have played themajor role
in instigating killing that many have claimed (Straus,
2007).
In challenging the idea that ideology drove the
genocide and complicating our understanding of moti-
vations, these works are not necessarily directly contra-
dicting Leave None to Tell but instead pushing its
argument and adding to the understanding of why
people killed. In my own work on the churches and the
genocide, I explore the issue of motivations somewhat
differently. In looking at the influence of Christianity, I
suggest that church teaching did not exactly encourage
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and ultimately made killing them morally acceptable. I
agree with Fujii and Straus that most people did not kill
out of hatred but I do suggest that the ideology had a
couple of important roles. First, it helped to create a clear
line between Hutu and Tutsi, which identified Tutsi as a
distinct group to be excluded and targeted. Second, I
contend that the ideology did in fact influence many of
the elite who had seen their monopoly on power
increasingly challenged in recent years. Some of the elite
I knew in the period prior to the genocide seemed to
sincerely hate the Tutsi, blaming them for attacking the
country and exploiting its population (Longman, 2010).
RPF Violence
A final area where scholarship has challenged the
argument in Leave None to Tell is one that Des Forges
herself embraced fully in subsequent years: the involve-
ment of the RPF in violence against civilians. We have
gained considerable information about RPF violence in
the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1996–97 and
1998–2003 wars (Umutesi, 2000; Bradol and Le Pape,
2017)2 but that violence falls outside the timeframe
considered by Leave None to Tell. Similarly, numerous
recent works have explored the violent and authoritarian
nature of RPF rule since 1994 (Reyntjens, 2013).3 Not
much additional data has appeared regarding RPF
violence from 1990–94. An insider account by RPF
dissident Abdul Ruzibiza both accuses Kagame of
organising the assassination of Habyarimana and
argues that massacres of Hutu were intentional rather
than random (Ruzibiza, 2005). Journalist Judi Rever’s
recent book, In Praise of Blood, is quite sensationalistic in
accusing the RPF of crimes against humanity, including
genocide, but it provides only limited new information
about RPF abuses within Rwanda. It does provide more
detail about several instances discussed by Des Forges,
such as massacres in RPF-occupied Byumba (Rever,
2018). No academic has yet written a well-researched
and detailed account of RPF violence, most likely because
doing the necessary research would be both prohibitively
difficult and extremely dangerous (Rever, 2018; Santoro,
2015).4
In reality, the chapter on RPF abuses in Leave None to
Tell already contains quite detailed discussion of RPF
massacres and summary executions. Des Forges both
discusses patterns of RPF violence and also documents a
number of specific attacks.What has changed since 1999,
then, is less the data about RPF abuses than their
framing. In Leave None to Tell, Des Forges treats the
RPF violence as serious but also rather incidental to the
key story, which is the genocide. In subsequent years,
however, it became increasingly clear that even as
extensive efforts were made to hold genocide perpetra-
tors accountable, RPF officials involved in war crimes
and crimes against humanity would face no conse-
quences. Although the ICTR was authorised to include
RPF crimes within its consideration, the ICTR brought
no charges against RPF officials. In fact, when Chief
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte attempted to launch inves-
tigations into RPF crimes, the RPF used its influence to
have the tribunal reorganised and a new prosecutor
appointed. In the last several years before her death, Des
Forges increasingly highlighted the significance of RPF
crimes and the need for accountability in order to avoid
the appearance of victors’ justice.
Leave None to Tell as a Research Model
The research project that produced Leave None to Tell
the Story was a unique undertaking. While organised by
human rights organisations, the project employed a
number of academic researchers and produced a report
that is closer to an academic text than a traditional
human rights report. Des Forges herself had a PhD in
history, as didMicheleWagner and Christine Deslaurier,
while I was trained in political science and Catherine
Choquet worked at the University of Paris 1. Kirsti Lattu
and Trish Hiddleston had backgrounds in humanitarian
work. Only Eric Gillet and Lynn Welchman had back-
grounds as human rights lawyers, the more typical
qualification for a human rights researcher.
In closing, I want to suggest that this cooperative
project between academics and human rights organisa-
tions was a highly beneficial endeavour that should be a
model for future collaborations. Research done by
groups like HRW and Amnesty International ordinarily
falls somewhere between journalism and academic
research. While journalists are generally looking for
things that make a good story, particularly the extra-
ordinary, human rights researchers are more interested
in patterns of abuse, avoiding focus on one-time
incidents or actions outside the ordinary. In my experi-
ence researching and writing reports for HRW, emphasis
is placed on gathering eyewitness accounts and ensuring
that published claims are always based on more than one
account. HRW, FIDH and Amnesty do not have
institutional research boards, but in training for
researchers, emphasis is placed on protection of sources
and the legal office carefully vets reports to ensure that
claims are supported by evidence sufficiently to be able to
stand up in court.
Academic research differs from research by human
rights organisations in some subtle ways. Human rights
organisations like journalists are focused on timeliness,
seeking to expose unknown stories about events cur-
rently underway and make news. Academic researchers
tend to be more interested in understanding events in
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even if it means that a story may be delayed. It is not that
human rights researchers are in any way careless – in
fact, the reputation of their organisations requires that
they not be – but expedience is more important than
thoroughness. If additional facts need to be uncovered,
the preference is generally to go ahead in a timely
manner with the claims that can be substantiated and to
include additional details in subsequent reports.
In the case of Leave None to Tell, HRW hoped that it
would be published in 1996, and they were deeply
frustrated that Des Forges continued to research and
refine the text for several more years.5 Yet what was
sacrificed in terms of expediency was gained in terms of
precision and thoroughness. Des Forges literally spent
years chasing down details, seeking out witnesses and
documentation in order to complete the story of the
genocide. The resulting document had an impact
different than that of a traditional human rights report,
but its impact has been profound, particularly on
increasing accountability for the genocide.
I know of no comparable projects that brought
academics actively into human rights organisation
research, but I believe that the precedent set by the
Rwandan genocide research project sponsored by HRW
and FIDH deserves to be replicated in other contexts.
Human rights organisations not only focus on exposing
human rights abuses but also on seeking accountability
for those abuses. While less expedient, the type of
research that academics conduct can provide the detail
and documentation needed to more effectively prosecute
cases against perpetrators of mass atrocities. The inter-
action between human rights lawyers and academic
researchers is productive for both communities, as it
forces academics to think in practical, real-world terms.
Although the brilliance of Leave None to Tell the Story is
due in large part to the personal brilliance of Alison Des
Forges, something that is impossible to replicate, human
rights groups can nevertheless effectively draw on
scholars with deep knowledge of specific countries and
their histories in ways that will enrich human rights work
and expand the impact of their organisations.
Notes
1 According to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is defined
as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group; b. Causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; … .’
2 Umutesi was initially the most influential. The UN
investigative report mapping human rights violations in
Congo released in 2010 provided details and proof of
massive human rights violation in Eastern Congo. Office
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, ‘Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the
Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed within the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June
2003’, Geneva: OHCHR, August 2010, www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_
FINAL_EN.pdf (accessed 21 February 2019).
3 Most notable is Reyntjens (2013) who provides a detailed
chronicle of abuses of power by the RPF, including
human rights abuses.
4 Rever herself faced threats to herself and her family in
Europe and Canada traced to Rwandan forces.
5 This claim is based on my own conversations with HRW
officials during my time working for them.
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